The Demise of the Declaratory Judgment Action as a Device for Testing the Insurer\u27s Duty to Defend: A Postscript by Browne, J. Patrick
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Cleveland State Law Review Law Journals
1975
The Demise of the Declaratory Judgment Action as
a Device for Testing the Insurer's Duty to Defend:
A Postscript
J. Patrick Browne
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Insurance Law Commons, and the Torts Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
J. Patrick Browne, The Demise of the Declaratory Judgment Action as a Device for Testing the Insurer's Duty to Defend: A Postscript, 24 Clev.
St. L. Rev. 18 (1975)
available at https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol24/iss1/5
The Demise of the Declaratory Judgment Action as a Device
for Testing the Insurer's Duty to Defend: A Postscript
J. Patrick Browne*
F OR YEARS THE CONFLICT OF INTEREST PROBLEM that occasionally
arose out of the defense of an insured by his liability carrier
denying coverage under the policy was, for the most part ignored.
Now, within the last decade, it has surfaced as one of the most litigated
questions in the field of insurance law. In the last issue of this Review,1
this author attempted an exegesis of Motorists Mutual Insurance Co.
v. Trainor,2 then the latest pronouncement on the subject by the
Supreme Court of Ohio. Soon after that article was published, the
Supreme Court again addressed itself to the problem in State Farm
Fire & Casualty Co. v. Pildner.3 While the majority opinion in that
case sustains the thesis expressed in the aforementioned article, the
concurring opinion suggests a radical departure. This postscript,
then, will examine Pildner in the light of Trainor, and attempt a critical
analysis of the Pildner concurring opinion.
Before the appearance of the Pildner decision on January 6, 1975,
Trainor had been the latest of a series of Ohio cases dealing with
the conflict of interest problem. After reviewing Trainor in the con-
text of these previous decisions, this author ventured three conclu-
sions: First. Under the Trainor doctrine, the liability carrier has an
absolute duty to defend whenever the allegations of the complaint
bring the injured party's claim within the policy coverage, even where
the objective facts known to both the carrier and the insured clearly
indicate that the claim does not arise out of a risk covered by the
liability policy. If the carrier defends under a reservation or rights,
or under a nonwavier agreement to which the insured freely con-
sents, the carrier does not waive the coverage defense, and is neither
bound by the decision in the injured party's suit nor estopped from
raising the coverage defense at a later time. Rather, it has the express
right to assert the coverage defense in the injured party's supplemental
action brought under the provisions of Section 3929.06 of the Ohio Re-
vised Code. Since the question of coverage is postponed until the supple-
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mental action, the carrier may not circumvent its duty to defend by
attempting to resolve the coverage question in its favor through the
device of a declaratory judgment action brought prior to the trial of
the injured party's claim. 4
Second. Since the carrier may raise the coverage defense in the
supplemental action, and not until then, and since, with respect to
that coverage defense, it is not bound by the result in the injured
party's action against its insured, it does not have any conflict of
interest with the insured in the defense of that action. As long as the
carrier defends the action against its insured in "good faith," (i.e.,
as long as it puts forth its best efforts on behalf of its insured) the
insured has no need of independent counsel. Hence the Socony-Vacuum5
doctrine of reimbursement for independent counsel's attorney fees and
expenses is set aside and remains inoperable. The doctrine, however,
is resurrected and becomes operable if the carrier begins to act in
"bad faith" in its defense of the insured.
Third. Since the question of the carrier's liability to pay under
the coverage provisions of its policy remains open during the trial
of the injured party's claim, the carrier is not under a "good faith"
duty to accept a settlement offer within the limits of the policy. It does,
however, have the obligation of keeping the insured fully informed
with respect to such offers, and if the insured is so inclined, he may
accelerate a determination of coverage through the medium of a
declaratory judgment action brought prior to the determination of
the suit against him. If the declaration is in favor of coverage, the
carrier must exercise "good faith" in considering the settlement offer.
4 The typical "defense" clause of a liability insurance policy relates the duty to defend
directly to the duty to pay claims under the coverage provisions of the policy. Thus, the
"defense" clause in the standard family combination automobile policy reads, in part:
The company shall defend any suit alleging such bodily injury or property
damage and seeking damages which are payable under the terms of this policy.
And it is generally held that there is no duty to defend a claim for loss arising out of
a risk not covered by the policy. See, e.g., Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Continental Cas.
Co., 144 Ohio St. 382, 59 N.E.2d 199 (1945). Accordingly, if the carrier should
obtain a declaration of no coverage prior to the trial of the injured party's claim, it
could legitimately refuse to defend its insured against that claim on the ground that since
there is no coverage for the claim, there is likewise no duty to defend.
sSocony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 144 Ohio St. 382, 59 N.E.2d 199 (1945).
Essentially, the Socony-Vacuum doctrine is this: where, in the defense of an action, the
interests of the insured and the interests of his liability insurance carrier are in conflict, the
insured is entitled to independent counsel to represent his interests; the carrier is obligated
to pay that counsel's fees and expenses if the conflict is created by the carrier's denial of
coverage and the assumption of the defense under a reservation of rights or a non-
waiver agreement.
The doctrine has application, however, only if the carrier will be bound by the
results of the action it is defending, for only in such a case will it be tempted to slew
the defense in favor of no coverage. On the other hand, in such a situation, the insured
will be interested in directing the result of the case toward a finding of coverage. From
this, the conflict arises. If the results in the tort action are immaterial as far as the
coverage question is concerned, neither party will have any incentive to force those
results one way or the other, and there is no conflict.
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Of these three conclusions, the first has been confirmed by the
Supreme Court's decision in Pildner; the second has been put in
question by the concurring opinion in the case; and the third remains
untested.
Pildner involved the liability coverage provisions of a home-
owners policy issued to Richard C. Pildner by the State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co. Suit was brought against Pildner by Mr. & Mrs. Harry
William Bryan, the complaint alleging, in substance, that Pildner
"negligently injured the plaintiff [Harry William Bryan] by firing
a rifle shot which took effect in the body of said plaintiff." Shortly
after this action was commenced Pildner was convicted of the felony
of "shooting with intent to wound," and sentenced to a term of one
to twenty years in the Ohio State Reformatory.
Pildner made demand upon State Farm to defend the civil action
against him and to pay, up to the coverage limit, any judgment
rendered against him in that action. State Farm refused to defend
on the ground that coverage was precluded by exclusion (f) of the
policy:
This policy does not apply: . . . (f) to bodily injury or pro-
perty damage which is either expected or intended from the
standpoint of the insured.
Thereafter, armed with Pildner's conviction of the felony "shoot-
ing with intent to wound", State Farm filed a declaratory judgment
action against Pildner and the Bryans in which it sought a declara-
tion of no coverage and, correspondingly, no duty to defend. Pildner
filed a motion to dismiss the declaratory judgment action for failure
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted; the Bryans later
filed a similar motion. The common pleas court sustained the motions
to dismiss; the court of appeals reversed; and the case came before
the Supreme Court pursuant to State Farm's motion to certify the
record.
Citing Trainor6 and other decisions,7 that court reversed the
court of appeals and affirmed the decision of the court of common
pleas:
The duty of an insurer, under a policy of liability insurance,
to defend an action against an insured is dependent upon the
scope of the allegations of the complaint in the action against
the insured. Where the allegations of the complaint bring the
6Motorists Mutual Ins. Co. v. Trainor, 33 Ohio St. 2d 41, 294 N.E.2d 874 (1973).
7Lessak v. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. of New York, 168 Ohio St. 153, 151 N.E.2d 730
(1958); Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 144 Ohio St. 382, 59 NE.2d
199 (1945); and Bloom-Rosenblum-Kline Co. v. Union Indem. Co., 121 Ohio St. 220,
167 N.E. 884 (1929).
[Vol. 24:18
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action within the coverage of the policy, the insurer is re-
quired to defend, regardless of the ultimate outcome or its
liability to the insured.
In the present case, the Bryans' complaint alleges only
negligent injury. Appellant admits that liability for negligent
injury is within the scope of coverage under the terms of its
homeowner's policy, and appellant has a duty to defend the
insured in that action. The Court of Common Pleas was,
therefore, correct in dismissing appellant's complaint for
declaratory judgment for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted, since no facts giving rise to a justiciable
controversy were presented in the complaint." (citations
omitted).
It is now well-settled in Ohio that the question of coverage under
a liability insurance policy, as well as the question of duty to defend,
may be tested via a declaratory judgment action.' Thus, the court's
conclusion that such an action challenging coverage and the duty to
defend does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted is
incomprehensible unless it is also understood that, as a matter of
public policy, when the allegations of the complaint bring the claim
within the coverage of the policy, the carrier has an absolute duty
to defend. Since the duty to defend is contingent upon the duty to
pay the claim, any judicial determination that there is no coverage
under the policy, made while the action to be defended is still unre-
solved, would circumvent the duty to defend and frustrate the public
policy requiring such defense. Accordingly, the judicial determination
of coverage must be postponed until such time as the duty to defend
is satisfied. A fortiori, the carrier's action seeking a declaration of no
coverage, brought during the pendency of the injured party's action
against the insured, is premature, and for that reason does not state
a claim upon which relief can be granted. 10
8 40 Ohio St. 2d at 104 -..... N.E.2d at --- -.-
9The Travelers Indem. Co. v. Cochrane, Jr., 155 Ohio St. 305, 98 N.E.2d 840 (1951);
Ohio Farmers Indem. Co. v. Chames, 170 Ohio St. 209, 163 N.E.2d 367 (1959); Lessak
v. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. of New York, 168 Ohio St. 153, 151 N.E.2d 730 (1958);
and the Republic Indem. Co. v. Durell, 105 Ohio App. 153, 151 N.E.2d 687 (1957).
10 Since the public policy requiring a defense is for the benefit of the insured, the prohibition
against challenging coverage during the pendency of the injured party's suit applies only
to the carrier. The insured may waive his benefit by bringing his own declaratory judg-
ment action seeking a resolution of the coverage dispute at any time prior to the termination
of that action. If he does so, and the coverage question is resolved against him, it would
seem to follow that the carrier is entitled to withdraw from the defense of the action.
Likewise, since the obligation to defend assumed by the carrier is an obligation to defend
"any suit" which, from the face of the complaint, falls within the coverage of the policy,
it would seem to follow that the carrier is not precluded from seeking a declaration of no
coverage prior to the filing of suit against the insured. The carrier's obligation to defend,
and the public policy which makes that obligation absolute, does not come into play until
suit is commenced. Of course, if the injured party's suit is commenced while the carrier's
declaratory judgment action is still pending, the carrier's right to maintain the action is
lost, and it must either be continued until such time as the injured party's suit is resolved,
(Continued on next page)
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The foregoing is not readily gleaned from the majority opinion in
Pildner alone, but it becomes apparent when that case is read in con-
junction with Trainor. Further, this reading is comfirmed by Chief
Justice O'Neill's concurring opinion in Pildner:
[An insurance company's duty to defend an insured against
a civil action [is] ascertained solely from the allegations of
the complaint. In determining the existence or nonexistence
of this duty, neither the outcome of the litigation nor the
ultimate liability of the insurer is relevant. By informing the
insured that it is reserving its right to assert noncoverage,
the insurance company can defend the action without waiving
this right.11
In footnote 1 to the above remark, the Chief Justice continues:
The insurance company can assert noncoverage by refusing
to pay any judgment rendered against the insured in the
damage action, thus forcing the judgment creditor to utilize
the procedure set forth in R.C. 3929.06 for collecting money
from an insurance company. In a R.C. 3929.06 proceeding,
the insurance company can assert against the judgment
creditor any defense which it has against the insured.12
Thus, this author's first conclusion drawn from the Trainor decision,
and his expression of what is here called the Trainor doctrine, is
sustained by the majority and concurring opinions in Pildner.
The second conclusion of this author drawn from Trainor, how-
ever, has not fared as well, albeit it is questioned only in Chief
Justice O'Neill's concurring opinion. Since that concurring opinion
will no doubt point the way for future litigation in this area, it
requires examination.
Apparently, the Chief Justice does not concur in the Trainor
view that the carrier is not bound by the result in the injured party's
action against the insured, and that as a consequence thereof, as
long as the carrier defends that action in "good faith," there can be
no conflict of interest between it and the insured. To support this
conclusion, he notes that
Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as
adopted by this court on October 5, 1970, states that "a
lawyer should exercise independent professional judgment
on behalf of a client." This rule is made more specific by
E.C. 5-14, which states:
(Continued from preceding page)
or it must be dismissed without prejudice to the carrier's rights to raise the defense of
no coverage in the injured party's supplemental action.
' 40 Ohio St. 2d at 104-05 -...... N.E.2d at
12d. at 105 & n.1 ......... N.E.2. at ------ citing Bennett v. Swift & Co., 170 Ohio St. 168,
163 N.E.2d 362 (1959).
[Vol. 24:18
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"Maintaining the independence of professional judg-
ment required of a lawyer precludes his acceptance or con-
tinuation of employment that will adversely affect his judg-
ment on behalf of or dilute his loyalty to a client. This problem
arises whenever a lawyer is asked to represent two or more
clients who may have differing interests, whether such
interests be conflicting, inconsistent, diverse, or otherwise
discordant."
E.C. 5-17 specifically lists among "typically recurring
situations involving potentially differing interests" a lawyer
representing an insured and his insurer. This factual pattern
exists when ever an insurance company which asserts non-
coverage is allowed to select an attorney to represent an in-
sured in a damage action.
... In such case, although the company has a duty to
defend the insured, there is an undeniable conflict between
the insurance company and the insured. The insured, if he
cannot totally escape liability, will desire to show that his
liability is based on negligent conduct which is covered by his
insurance policy. The insurance company will, on the other
hand, desire to prove that the insured's actions were ... not
within the scope of the policy.13
What has been said so far is really nothing new; the courts, the
bar, and the insurance industry have been struggling with this problem
almost since the inception of liability insurance. This author's previous
article dealt with the various ways of neutralizing this conflict.14
Chief Justice O'Neill appears to reject these traditional methods,
including the Trainor solution, in favor of a more radical approach.
13 Id. at 105-06 ......... N .E.2d at ---------
14 To the methods there discussed, there should, perhaps be added the action for breach of
the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, a developing concept which imposes a
stringent burden of fairness upon the insurance carrier in all its transactions with its
insured. The concept that a contract of insurance is one of utmost good faith, and that
the parties to such a contract must deal with each other fully and fairly, is as old as
insurance itself. It would appear that the concept was first categorized as an implied
convenant of the contract in Communale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 50 Cal. 2d 654,
328 P.2d 198 (1958), in which it was held that the carrier's failure to accept a reasonable
settlement offer was a breach of "an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing ...
that neither party will do anything which will injure the right of the other to receive the
benefits of the agreement." Id. at 658, 328 P.2d at 200. The reach of this covenant was
expanded in Gruenberg v. Atena Ins. Co., 9 Cal. 3d 566, 510 P.2d 1032, 108 Cal. Rptr.
480 (1973), and its burden was imposed on the individual agents of the carrier in
Eaganv. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co., Wall Street Journal, Nov. 27, 1974 at 7, col. 2
(Eastern ed.).
An action for breach of this covenant of good faith and fair dealing has received
some recognition in Ohio, albeit under the cognomen of tortious breach of contract.
See Kirk v. Safeco Ins. Co., 28 Ohio Misc. 44, 273 N.E.2d 919 (C.P. 1970).
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His concurring opinion in Pildner goes on to say:
Under these facts, I believe that D.R. 5-105, which is man-
datory, dictates that the insurance company not be allowed
to select counsel to defend the insured. The adversity between
the insurance company and the insured, coupled with the
pressure which the insurance company could exert on counsel
selected by it, simply presents too great a possibility that that
counsel's loyalty to the insured will be diluted.
The insurance company, when it notifies an insured who
is being sued that it denies coverage, should invite the
insured to select his own counsel to represent him in the
damage action. If the action is one in which the insurance
company has a duty to defend, reasonable attorney fees and
other proper costs incurred by the insured in making his
defense will ultimately have to be assumed by the insurance
company."5
The essential difficulty with this solution is that the conflict of
interest between the insured and the carrier is a two-edged sword.
If this solution interposes a shield between the carrier and the insured,
it also leaves the carrier defenseless. If the insured is represented
solely by counsel of his own choice - an attorney with neither ties
nor obligations to the carrier - what is to prevent that counsel from
so presenting the defense of the case as to establish coverage?16 To
say that this will not happen because the insured's counsel will honor
his ethical and professional responsibilities is to condemn the attorneys
regularly selected by the insurance carrier as unethical and unpro-
fessional, since the Chief Justice's argument assumes that they will
15 40 Ohio St. 2d at 106, ....... N.E.2d at --------- citing Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Continental
Cas. Co., 144 Ohio St. 382, 59 N.E.2d 199 (1945). D.R. 5-105, to which the quote
makes reference, is Disciplinary Rule 5-105, and reads as follows:
(A) A lawyer shall decline proffered employment if the exercise of his inde-
pendent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is likely to be
adversely affected by the acceptance of the proffered employment, except
to the extent permitted under DR 5-105(C).
(B) A lawyer shall not continue multiple employment if the exercise of his
independent professional judgment in behalf of a client will be or is
likely to be adversely affected by his representation of another client, except
to the extent permitted under DR 5-105 (C).
(C) In the situations covered by DR 5-105 (A) and (B), a lawyer may represent
multiple clients if it is obvious that he can adequately represent the
interest of each and if each consents to the representation after full dis-
closure of the possible effect of such representation on the exercise of
his independent professional judgment on behalf of each.
(D) If a lawyer is required to decline employment or to withdraw from employ-
ment under DR 5-105, no partner or associate of his or his firm may
accept or continue such employment.
23 Ohio St. 2d 1, 34 (1970).
16 It is presumed here that the coverage question is open to honest debate and that the
carrier has not arbitrarily denied coverage.
[Vol. 24 : 18
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succumb to the pressures imposed by the conflict of interest. If such
an assumption is valid (and there is no real evidence that it is),
there is no apparent reason why it does not apply both ways. Indeed,
it might well be argued that the insured's independent counsel would
be doing less than his duty if no attempt was made to secure for the
insured the protection afforded by the policy. Thus, Chief Justice
O'Neill's solution does not solve the conflict of interest problem; rather,
it loads the coverage question against the carrier and practically
predetermines that question otherwise honestly open to dispute, in
favor of the insured.
Further, in this age of ever-increasing insurance premiums, there
is a multi-faceted economic argument which militates against this
solution. First, since the "defense bar" is to some extent dependent
upon the insurance industry for continued business, and since there
is intense competition within the "bar" for this business, each firm
or attorney is constrained to keep his or its fees as low as possible in
order to obtain that business. But the insured's independent counsel,
knowing full well that he is not likely to be selected by the insurance
carrier as counsel in any other case it might be obligated to defend,
is under no such constraint. The only limitation upon the fees charged
by such counsel is that they be "reasonable," and that is a question for
determination by the court. Since insurance companies are not thought
to be impoverished, it is not unlikely that a "reasonable" fee, in any
given case, would be higher than that charged by a defense "regular".
Secondly, insurance companies make every effort to keep the
costs of defense as low as possible.1 7 Defense firms are well aware
of this and, in order to retain these companies as clients, they, too,
keep defense costs down by refraining from, for example, filing
unnecessary motions or taking unnecessary depositions. But the
insured's independent counsel, not being subject to these restriants
of the marketplace, and having his fees and costs practically guar-
anteed, is free to indulge in those marginally productive maneuvers
and devices which would be prohibitive to counsel selected by the
company. This can unnecessarily increase the costs of defense, but
it can also impose unnecessary and time-consuming burdens on a
court that is already in despair over a hopelessly backlogged civil
docket.18 This likely increased cost can also result from a want of
skill and experience; that is, it may simply take independent counsel
more time to perform work which an experienced defense counsel
could perform with greater dispatch and, to a certain extent, as a
matter of routine. Independent counsel, for example, might have to
17 See How Companies Fight Soaring Legal Costs, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 16, 1974, at 104.
18 See, e.g., a series of articles and opinions appearing under the cover title of Crisis in the
Courts, 45 CLEVE. B. J. 352, et. seq. (1974).
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spend many hours researching a point of law while the regularly ap-
pointed defense counsel might have that same research ready at hand,
in a "brief file" maintained by his office.
Third, even in the absence of so much as a hint of chicanery on
the part of independent counsel, the defense "regular" can most
probably defend the case at a lower hourly cost to the insurance carrier.
Much of the routine work on a case can be done by associates in
the defense firm, with the actual trial, perhaps, reserved to a partner.
The hourly charge for an associate's work is less than that for a
partner's work, and the bulk of the work will most likely be done by
associates under the partner's supervision. But that is not likely to
be the case with the independent counsel, who is apt to be a sole
practitioner, or an attorney in association with two or three other
attorneys. In all probalility, such an attorney will have to do all of
the preparation and trial by himself, at a uniform hourly charge
which will most likely not be less than the hourly charge of a partner
in a defense firm, and most probably slightly more. Moreover, a
regular defense firm in competition for the defense business will
occasionally not charge hours of work actually done if the over-all
fee bill seems higher than the insurance company is likely to accept
with equanimity. But independent counsel, who will not again be
"retained" by the insurance company, is under no such constraint.
While lower fees do not necessarily mean lower premiums, higher
fees most certainly mean higher premiums, and the insurance con-
sumer will be the ultimate victim of this solution to the conflict of
interest problem.
Irrespective of the economic considerations, there is also the
possibility that the defense "regular" will perform with greater
skill - at least in the majority of cases. Over the years, the members
of the insurance defense bar have built up a degree of skill and ex-
pertise in trial advocacy that is matched only by their opponents
in the plaintiffs' bar. Even the young associate in such a firm, with
only one or two years' experience, is likely to have more trial skill
and ability than the average lawyer who rarely has occasion to try
a case to its conclusion. On the whole, in any sizeable community, most
trial work is conducted by a small fraternity of experienced trial
lawyers, and the practicing bar in general has little or no experience
in trial advocacy.
Yet if, as the Chief Justice suggests, the insured is free "to
select his own counsel to represent him in the damage action," who is
he most likely to select? It is safe to say that the average insured is
not personally acquainted with any lawyer, let alone an experienced
trial lawyer. While the Yellow Pages are open to the perspective client,
they do not, as yet, list specialties. He may obtain some referral
assistance from the Bar Association, but he may not know of its
[Vol. 24 : 18
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existence or of its referral system. In short, left to his own devices, the
insured is likely to select an attorney unskilled in trial advocacy.
Of course, it can be argued that his insurance company must
supply him with a list of attorneys from which he may choose. How-
ever, the company is most likely to select those attorneys which it
regularly seeks out for defense work, which would be only one small
step removed, if any, from the pressure and resulting conflict of
interest which the Chief Justice envisions. In any case, since the
insurance carrier has already intimated that it will deny coverage
to the insured under the policy, the insured would not be likely to
trust the selection proffered.
In summary, the insured's free choice of an attorney is not cal-
culated to provide him with the best defense available, and it seems
anomalous, at a time when the Chief Justice of the United States
Supreme Court is lamenting the lack of skilled trial advocates, 9
that the insured is deprived of access to a pool of the most skilled
defense attorneys in his community.
Finally, the proposed solution to the conflict of interest problem
is bound to produce fraud and collusion in some cases. Suppose for
example, that the shooting in Pildner was unquestionably an inten-
tional act and the insured did intend to kill or seriously injure the
plaintiff. And suppose further that the plaintiff's complaint alleged
such an intentional act rather than negligence. Such an act would
not be covered by the policy of insurance and the carrier would
be within its rights to reject the defense of the civil action. The
insured has retained an attorney to represent him in that action. But
the insured is personally without assets, and the attorney chosen
is concerned about his fee. How might the attorney seek to remedy
the situation? One answer may be a telephone call to the plaintiff's
attorney suggesting an amended complaint substituting an allega-
tion of negligence for the allegation of intentional shooting, or adding
such an allegation as an alternative claim. The amendment of the
complaint should not tax his conscience overmuch, since justification
can exist for it.20 Such a maneuver will bring the insurance carrier
19 Chief Justice Burger Proposes First Steps Toward Certification of Trial Advocacy Specialists,
60 A.B.A.J. 171 (1974).
20 See, e.g., Gray v. Zurich Ins. Co., 65 Cal. 2d 263, 419 P.2d 168, 177, 54 Cal. Rptr. 104,
113 (1966), where it is said:
Jones' complaint dearly presented the possibility that he might obtain damages
that were covered by the indemnity provisions of the policy. Even conduct
that is traditionally classified as "intentional" or 'wilful" has been held to fall
within indemnification coverage. Moreover, despite Jones' pleading of intentional
and wilful conduct, he could have amended his complaint to allege merely
negligent conduct. Further, plaintiff might have been able to show that in
(Continued on next page)
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into the case, albeit on a reservation of rights basis. But it is that
very basis, under Chief Justice O'Neill's proposed solution, that will
insure the original attorney's retention as defense counsel in the case.
This action would also appeal to plaintiff's counsel, since at the very
least the presence of the insurance company will enhance his chances
for settlement if not a greater recovery on the claim. And if the de-
fense attorney is careful and clever, he can so manipulate the defense
of the suit as to insure an ultimate finding of coverage, thus guar-
anteeing his fee.
Examples could be multiplied, but without any useful purpose,
since they all lead to the same result - a strained or false allegation
to bring the case within the coverage of the policy. The insurance
carrier is then given Hobson's choice: if it defends without reserving
its rights or obtaining a voluntary nonwaiver agreement, it waives
the coverage defense;21 and if it asserts its reservation of rights or
obtains a nonwaiver agreement, it loses control of the defense of the
action, while the plaintiff and the insured collusively or fraudulently
maneuver themselves into a position to raid its treasury. Under the
Chief Justice's proposed solution, the plaintiff has every incentive to
reach that treasury; the insured has no incentive to prevent him;
and the carrier has no means of imposing a check on either.
In short, the chief difficulty with the proposed solution to the
conflict of interest problem is that it is one-sided. It protects the
insured from the adverse interests of the insurance company, but
gives the company no protection from the adverse interests of the
insured and all too readily lends itself to fraud and collusion. In addi-
tion, it is economically wasteful, and potentially deprives the insured
of the best defense counsel available to him. In the long run, of
(Continued from preceding page)
physically defending himself, even if he exceeded the reasonable bounds of
self-defense, he did not commit wilful and intended injury, but engaged only in
nonintentional tortious counduct. Thus, even accepting the insurer's premise
that it had no obligation to defend actions seeking damages not within the
indemnification coverage, we find, upon proper measurement of the third party
action against the insurer's liability to indemnify, it should have defended
because the loss could have fallen within that liability.
In Burd v. Sussex Mut. Ins. Co., 56 N.J. 383, 267 A.2d 7 (1970), the New Jersey Supreme
Court said of the above passage:
The California court held, as one ground for its decision, that the carrier was
obligated to defend because under modern pleading an allegation of intentional
wrong carries inherently the "potential" of a recovery upon the lesser thesis
of a negligent injury. Hence, the court held, the charge on its face came within
the policy coverage notwithstanding that ultimately it might be found the injury
was intentionally inflicted within the meaning of the express exclusion from
coverage.
Thus, negligence becomes something of a "lesser included offense" of intentional act,
and may be alleged in good conscience, even if the pleader believes that the defendant's
act was intentional.
21 Socony-Vacuum Oil Co. v. Continental Cas. Co., 144 Ohio St. 382, 59 N.E.2d 199 (1945).
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course, it is the insuring public that must suffer from this solution's
defects, since they will pay for them through the medium of higher
insurance premiums.
A better solution is that espoused by Trainor and found by impli-
cation in the majority opinion in Pildner. This solution is built upon
a rejection of the two assumptions which underlie Chief Justice
O'Neill's solution: (1) that factual determinations made in the
injured party's action against the insured will be binding on the
insurance carrier in the injured party's supplemental action against
it; and (2) that the attorney who defends the insured in the injured
party's action will be the same attorney who represents the insurance
company in that supplemental action.
The first supposition is logically inconsistent with the Trainor
doctrine as well as with the Chief Justice's own view of the carrier's
rights, as expressed in his concurring opinion in Pildner. An under-
standing of the two-fold nature of coverage defenses is essential for
an understanding of the Trainor doctrine as necessary background
for illustrating this inconsistency. Basically, coverage defenses are of
two types: factual defenses and policy defenses. Factual defenses
arise out of the facts and circumstances of the incident upon which
the claim for coverage is based. Policy defenses arise out of fraud or
misrepresentation on the part of the insured which justifies recission
or cancellation of the policy; or out of a failure to pay premiums when
due which results in a lapse of the policy; or out of some breach of
condition on the part of the insured2 which warrants the carrier
in denying coverage. In almost all cases, these policy defenses are
wholly independent of the facts and circumstances surrounding the
incident which fosters the charge against the insured. On the con-
trary, factual defense are wholly dependent upon those facts and
circumstances.
Accordingly, if the concurring opinion in Pildner addresses itself
to policy defenses when it says that the carrier may deny coverage,
under a reservation of rights or nonwaiver agreement, without waiv-
ing these defenses, and that the carrier may assert these defenses in
the judgment-creditor's supplemental action over, the opinion is mean-
ingless, since, in the ordinary cases, these defenses cannot be affected
by the decision in the injured party's action against the insured.
Therefore, the remark must have reference to factual defenses. And
indeed, both Trainor and Pildner have to do with factual defenses
rather than policy defenses.
E.g., late notice of the incident, failure to forward suit papers, or failure to cooperate with
the carrier.
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But, with respect to factual defenses, the assumption that the
factual determinations in the injured party's action are binding on
the insurance carrier, thereby creating the conflict of interest, is
wholly inconsistent with the assertion that the carrier may assert these
defenses in the supplemental action. If the factual determinations in
the injured party's action are binding on the carrier, and go against
the carrier on the question of coverage, then the carrier has nothing
left to assert in the supplemental proceeding. Yet the carrier's ab-
solute duty to defend the insured, without opportunity for testing that
duty by means of a declaratory judgment action or otherwise, is
imposed on the carrier with the promise that the carrier can, at a
later time, test its duty to provide coverage. If the carrier is denied
that right by the binding results in the injured party's action, that
promise is hollow. Therefore, if that promise is to have meaning, the
factual determinations made in the tort action cannot be binding
on the carrier with respect to its factual coverage defenses. Rather
these questions of fact remain open and are to be decided in the supple-
mental action if the carrier asserts them. As it is said in paragraph
1 of the syllabus of Trainor:
An insurance company, which by contract is obligated to
defend its insured in a negligence action, may defend in
good faith without waiving its right to assert at a later time
the policy defenses it believes it has, provided that it gives
its insured notice of any reservation of rights.23 (Emphasis
added.)
However, if the factual determinations made in the tort action
are not binding on the carrier vis-h-vis its factual coverage defenses,
where is the conflict of interest? Since the carrier will gain nothing
by manipulating the defense one way or the other, it can afford to
be disinterested in the action against the insured - in all respects
save one. That one exception is that the carrier will be as intensely
interested in winning the tort suit as will the insured, since a judg-
ment for the insured will automatically eliminate the coverage con-
troversy and save the carrier money.
The result would not be different in the case of a loss. If the
determination in the injured party's suit cannot bind the carrier as
to the factual coverage defense, neither can it bind the insured or the
injured party. Since neither party can assert that result against the
other, neither party can gain by manipulating the defense, and neither
party can have any incentive for doing so.
2 Here, of course, the Supreme Court is using the term "policy defenses" in the sense of
"coverage defenses" rather than in the restricted sense given to the term "policy defenses"
in the text of this article.
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Therefore, if the Trainor doctrine is to have meaning, the
Chief Justice's first assumption must fail, and with it must fail his
conclusion that there is a conflict of interest; that is, unless his second
assumption, that the same attorney will be involved in both actions,
is true.
Yet the second supposition would be inconsistent with the Trainor
requirement that the carrier defend its insured in "good faith." This
assumption presupposes that the attorney selected to defend the in-
sured in the damage action will abandon that cause on the conclusion
of that action, and adhere to the cause of the insurance company in
the supplemental proceeding. If such were to be the case, the pos-
sibility, if not the probability, of a conflict of interest would remain.
In the defense of the first action, the defense attorney would most
probably receive confidences and information from the insured which
he could not, in good conscience, use against the insured's interest
in the supplemental proceeding. If those confidences and that infor-
mation would establish the carrier's case for no coverage, the attorney
can neither divorce himself from his knowledge of them nor can he
refrain from using what he knows and remain loyal to his new
"client." Accordingly, he can very well find himself in an impossible
situation; to serve one client he may have to betray the other. And this
he may not do if, as Chief Justice O'Neill points out, he is to adhere
to Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly,
the same defense attorney may not represent both the insured in
the injured party's action and the insurance carrier in the supple-
mental proceeding; if the insurance carrier wishes to retain its right
to control the defense of the inj ured party's action, it must select one
attorney to represent the insured exclusively, and another attorney
to represent its own interests.
Indeed, this result is mandated by the Trainor doctrine's insis-
tence that the company must defend the insured in "good faith" if
it wishes to retain the right to control that defense. Good faith re-
quires nothing less than the selection of an attorney who will represent
the insured's interests to the exclusion of the interests of the car-
rier. As long as the carrier adheres to this standard it may retain
the right to select the defense attorney; but if it falls short, it not only
breaches its covenant of good faith and fair dealing, but it loses its
right to select the defense attorney, and its concommitant control of
the defense, and must, under the Socony-Vacuum rule, reimburse
the insured for his costs in retaining an independent counsel of his
choice as well as the other costs of the defense.
Conclusion
Concededly, there is no perfect solution to the conflict of interest
problem. The two-fold Trainor solution is subject to corruption by
either the insurance carrier or the attorney it selects to defend the
1975]
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insured. But the Trainor solution is less subject to corruption than the
solution proposed by Chief Justice O'Neill in his concurring opinion
in Pildner. Trainor provides each party more equal protection against
betrayal while affording the insured an opportunity for better repre-
sentation than he might have if left to select a defense attorney on
his own.
Even though it requires the employment of not less than two
independent and highly skilled attorneys, it is most likely to be
less expensive and less economically wasteful than the O'Neill solution.
But even if it is not, since it affords the insurance carrier some pro-
tection in the control of the insured's defense, it is likely to be ac-
cepted by the carrier with better grace than would the solution pro-
posed by Chief Justice O'Neill.
In conclusion, since the O'Neill solution is no better than that
advanced in Trainor, and is in many ways worse, the latter should be
.retained at least until such time as it clearly proves to be unworkable.
As it stands now, its retention is squarely in the hands of the insur-
ance companies. Chief Justice O'Neill has proferred the warning: if
the companies do not provide the insured with wholly independent
counsel, or if they attempt to pressure that counsel, or obtain from
him information which he is not privileged to give, they will not be
defending in "good faith," and will, under the Chief Justice's logical
extension of the Socony-Vacuum doctrine, forfeit the right to select
the counsel to represent the insured. While the Chief Justice's con-
curring opinion is not yet the law in this State, it will no doubt
become so, either universally, or on a case by case basis, if the com-
panies prove recalcitrant with respect to their good faith duty to
defend the insured whenever the allegations of the complaint bring
the case within the policy coverage.
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